The small scale of the island states and territories in the Caribbean are natural experiments, testing the limits of the scalability of orthodox policies and instruments used in telecommunications developed in and for Europe and the USA. Many islands have significant numbers of tourists and revenues from International Mobile Roaming (IMR). While poorer citizens have access to mobile telephony, use is primarily social and within a small group. There are very low levels of Internet usage. For some SIDS, remittances are important parts of the GDP, making m-payment attractive to mobile operators. Competition has been limited two or three mobile operators and one or two fixed operators. Often the same players are in several markets, with repeated interactions raising risks of tacit collusion. Key aspects of governance are difficult or absent. While most have a regulator there are few specialist appellate bodies or parliamentary committees to oversee their work.
Introduction
The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the Caribbean lie at the margin, both geographically and in terms of size, with many being termed micro-states or micro-territories. This presents problems in terms of the non-scalability of engineering, markets and governance, with global best practice having to be re-evaluated and adjusted before it can be applied to specific cases. A market of 500,000 or 50,000 or 5,000 people cannot readily support all the elements of a complex system of governance (parliamentary committees, ministry, regulator, appellate body, auditor general, consumer groups, etc.), nor is it likely to be particularly attractive to prospective market entrants and thus changes will be slow.
The markets being small, some operators have chosen to enter several, achieving modest economies of scale and a sort of specialization in SIDS. Cable & Wireless, now trading under the Caribbean sounding Lime brand, is the traditional postImperial British carrier. Whereas, the Digicel Group, also from the British Isles, poses as the challenger with its more aggressive marketing. The two other large players in the region are the France Telecom Group (trading as Orange Caraïbes) and América Móvil (trading as Claro).
There are also some smaller players, but they lack economies of scale and seem likely to struggle with migration to FTTH, 3G and LTE, both in terms of the capital and of the expertise required. Their future is anything but certain, even if their withdrawal from the individual island markets would significantly reduce competition.
In a market with a relatively stable duopoly, with little or even no prospect of a change in the character or the number of players, it is not straightforward to measure competition. Conventional indicators such as market concentration or "churn" statistics will not necessarily reflect improvements in performance driven by competition, making it necessary to probe deeper into the data. There are concerns, both from theory and practice, that market players might settle into a cosy oligopoly, rather than engaging in competition. Consequently, it is necessary to identify measures that can be tracked over time to show that competition is operating effectively and to have at hand instruments that can, if necessary, be used to intensify the competitive pressures.
A range of measures, a sort of regulatory cookbook, is used to facilitate market entry and to sustain competition. Yet smallness, remoteness and non-contiguity limit the attractiveness of a market, even when entry is possible, and may undermine or invalidate traditional recipes for regulatory success.
An important check on the performance of markets and also of the regulation of those markets is by benchmarking with other countries and territories. In the first instance, this is amongst similar Caribbean jurisdictions, then more widely in the Caribbean and finally with other SIDS in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans.
The scales of the economies, populations and geographical extent of the Caribbean states and territories vary greatly, from tiny to medium-sized, from the very poor to the relatively rich (see Table 1 ). This paper first examines the growth of mobile telephony in the Caribbean, particularly in the Eastern Caribbean states. Questions concerning the ownership of multiple phones and SIM-cards are then raised. Comparisons of prices within the region are made. The possible influence of tourists is then set out. A short discussion of interconnection rates between fixed and mobile networks is provided. Issues related to mobile banking are identified. Conclusions are drawn, together with issues for future research.
The growth of mobile telephony in the Caribbean
Mobile telephony in the Caribbean has grown rapidly over the last decade (see Figure 1 ). The impressive performances give rise to the concern that significant numbers of customers are being counted several times, once each for different mobile phones and SIM-cards. The very large numbers for, say, Antigua and Aruba might be the result of better economic performance and smarter regulation or could simply be a greater prevalence of multiple ownership of SIM-cards than in, say, Dominica and Grenada. Consequently, comparisons have to be made with great care. The poorest performance is by Cuba, with a state-owned monopoly operator. Explanations for variations in national performance are usually seen as being related to:
• Differences in the levels of competition;
• The number of operators;
• Specific timings of market entry;
• Possibilities of regulatory capture; and
• Difficulties in customers switching between rivals, because of, for example:
o the sale of SIM-locked handsets, o the absence of number portability and o the similarities in the tariffs.
A complication in the Caribbean arises from the large number of tourists and other visitors, generating significant revenues for the operators. In those islands with large numbers of visitors operators may be using roaming revenues to cross-subsidize domestic services, for example, to reduce the price of handsets in order to acquire customers. Operators on other islands may be less able to engage in such practices.
More than 100 phones per 100 persons
The very high numbers, some in excess of 100 per cent mobile teledensity, are not easily explained. A figure of 90 to 95 per cent is the likely upper limit of mobile telephone ownership, once you eliminate infants and the very old, the disinterested and the very poor, the incarcerated and the insane. A very high level should only be attainable in countries at the most advanced level of economic development, with narrow spreads of income and with appropriate support programs for the very poor.
While data for the Caribbean islands are limited, there are clearly significant disparities in the distribution of income and expenditure, notably with some quite high Gini scores (see Table 2 ). The disparities are supported by the levels of illiteracy and of people living in poverty. In many of the Caribbean islands there are significant numbers of people living in poverty for whom mobile telephones might well seem to be an unaffordable luxury. This issue has been examined in detail by the Diálogo regional sobre la Sociedad de la Información (Galperin & Mariscal, 2007) . It found very high levels of use and even of ownership of mobile handsets, indicating that many of the poor had already achieved access to mobile telephony, but that their use was constrained by levels of affordability both for basic and value-added services. Not only was mobile access widespread, but very large numbers of users had bought a new handset, including some quite expensive models. Yet, many of those with access were making few calls, waiting for cash or for incoming calls, perhaps "beeping" others in the hope of being called back. There was a stark contrast between the very high levels of access to mobile telephony and the very low levels of use of the Internet.
In Trinidad and Tobago those living below the "poverty line" had a high level of access to telecommunications, primarily to mobile telephony, though also fixed lines, supplemented by some use of pay phones (Mallalieu, 2007) . Individuals had reasonable levels of coverage in their homes and many had their own phones, though some borrowed the phones of others. Even in homes with no piped water there were often mobile phones. The level of demand was limited and inelastic, being primarily for social communication, rather than being used of business or work related activities.
In Jamaica 90 per cent of respondents to a survey had used a mobile phone in the preceding three months (Dunn, 2007 ). This appears to have been the case for some time, with first handsets having been purchased in previous years. The vast majority used pre-paid cards, with a retail outlet selling top-up cards only a couple of minutes away from their homes.
Thus, despite the evidence of poverty in many Caribbean islands, levels of access to mobile telephony appear to be very high. As yet, there are no specific data to confirm this for most of the islands. If true it suggests that policies needs to address the affordability of mobile services and that concerns over access can be focused on the Internet.
A multiplicity of phones and SIM-cards
The primary technical cause of the very high levels of mobile teledensity is individuals with multiple SIM-cards (Sutherland, 2009a) . Some people in the Caribbean carry:
• Two phones;
• A dual SIM-card phone; or
• One phone and two (or more) SIM-cards.
One reason for this is a form of carrier selection, choosing to call individuals on the network of the other person's operator in order to save money. This is caused partly by tariff structures and partly by relatively high interconnection rates. In the Eastern Caribbean there are considerable differences in pricing practices of the operators (see Figure 2 ). This seems to create quite different levels of incentive to hold two SIM-cards or two phones to make on-net calls and thus would have quite different effects on mobile teledensity. High off-net charges create a potential barrier to entry, since in most countries in the Caribbean customers already have at least one mobile phone and SIM card. Thus prospective customers of a new entrant face a strong disincentive, since their friends and colleagues will have to pay more to call them, unless they also acquire a SIM-card for the new network. This is reflected in some of the marketing of recent years, with operators almost flooding a new market with handsets and SIMcards. Consequently, only an operator with "deep pockets" is likely to enter such a market. Moreover, the operator must eventually turn a profit, so that the cost of the "free" handsets and SIM-cards must be recovered in higher tariffs or lower profits. Once established operators know there is such a formidable barrier they may be able to relax, by discounting the threat of a prospective market entrant.
Other reasons for the use of multiple networks include limited coverage and poor network reliability, with individuals being able to switch between operators in order to have a greater chance of service. This may not be coverage from a domestic operator, for example, some people in Anguilla may benefit from having an Orange Caraïbes SIM-card that permits access from some of the southern parts of the island to the network of Orange from the neighbouring St Martin, allowing outgoing calls within the Orange Caraïbes group at low prices and incoming calls free of charge. Any visiting European can obtain a regulated roaming tariff if they can find the Orange signal.
In some cases, a number and the associated SIM-card are retained from a previous carrier to be checked for SMS and voice mail until everyone knows and uses the new number. Some people have separate phones or SIM-cards for business and personal usage. This reflects social and cultural norms, such as the willingness to answer business calls outside office hours. It may also be a matter of the applicable tax law, where the provision of a mobile phone is deemed to be a benefit in kind and thus personal use is limited by the employer.
There are also people who have SIM-cards for two or more countries:
• Residents of North America and Europe with holiday homes in the Caribbean;
• Nationals of the Caribbean islands (and their children and descendants) living and working in North America and Europe who return regularly; and
• Short-term tourists.
It is substantially cheaper for local people including friends, taxi drivers and tradesmen to call someone using a national number than one from Europe or North America. There are also savings in making cheaper calls between family or group members while on holiday, avoiding double roaming charges.
All of the underlying problems might also be addressed as matters of public policy, since multiple subscriptions appear likely to be a sub-optimal solution. For example, they could be addressed by lowering interconnection rates to reduce on-net/off-net differentials, by sharing masts to improve coverage and by publication of quality of service data to encourage better performance.
The extent of the various practices described above is very poorly understood, though the reasons are all supported by anecdotal evidence. Survey work, asking different groups about their patterns of use of mobile phones will be needed in order to identify those whose use of mobile telephony is severely constrained and those carrying multiple phones and SIM-cards.
Only then can the social and economic costs be identified.
Tourists
Around forty million visitors arrived by air and by cruise line in 2008, primarily from North America and Europe (Griffith, 2009 ). The Caribbean Tourism Organization reported variable but significant reductions in tourist numbers to almost all islands as a result of the economic recession. This must have hit the roaming revenues of the operators with, for example, the Vodafone Group reporting a drop of 14 per cent year-on-year in 2009 Q3, which must have translated into a loss of revenues for Digicel, its partner in the Caribbean. In the absence of financial data it is not possible to assess the effect on the operators either directly or any effects on future investment plans or cross-subsidies to domestic services.
Tourists have the option of using their existing cellphones and SIM-cards, with the Caribbean operators having roaming arrangements with an impressive number of foreign operators. While most tourists to the Caribbean are not from the more cost conscious part of the market, the prices they are charged are not cheap (see Table 3 ). The final column represents the cost of a call between two people travelling together, both using the same the same home operator, whereas an on-net call with each using a local SIM-card would be less than EC$ 1. The wholesale market for roaming is relatively opaque, so that it is unclear how much money is being earned by the Anguillan operators and how much by the foreign operators. Nor are the total revenues earned by the Caribbean operators separated from domestic revenues. Prima facie, it looks as if the foreign operators are taking a substantial mark-up on the Caribbean wholesale prices but it also seems likely that, given the small size of some domestic markets, roaming is a vital part of the revenues of the mobile operators.
Price competition
The comparison of domestic tariffs is complicated, given the range of offers and the wider range of users of those tariffs. For many younger customers, a key question is the price of a text message, this is sometimes reflected in offers of 100 SMS alone or bundled with minutes of voice calls. Prices vary considerably between the islands and no obvious relationship to costs (see Figure 3 ). In some countries operators distinguish between on-net and off-net prices, in which case the lower price is shown. For example, in Grenada an additional EC$ 0.10 is paid if the recipient is on a rival network. The approach taken by the OECD to price comparisons has been to create baskets of charges representing different profiles of users: low, medium and high. To facilitate comparisons these are usually adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). However, since all the currencies in the Eastern Caribbean have been pegged to the USD for decades such adjustments are impossible.
The results for the low user basket for the Eastern Caribbean are shown in Figure 4 . This puts the region just below the OECD average of USD 163 PPP for August 2008 (OECD, 2009a) . There is very little difference between the two principal regional operators in general, though in some countries there would clearly be a benefit in selecting one over the other. Prices are not especially high, nor are they cheap, certainly no cheap enough given the often modest levels of income in the islands. It suggests quite limited levels of competitive pressures on prices.
Interconnection rates
When first introduced mobile telephony was assumed to be a premium service for which there would be limited demand. In Europe new number ranges were created associated with which were relatively high interconnection rates, these gradually evolved into the system of Calling Party Pays (CPP). In the USA, numbers were assigned from the North American Numbering Plan (NANP) and rather than charge the caller, the Receiving Party Pays (RPP) for the "air time" used for incoming calls as well as outgoing calls. CPP proved attractive in developing and least developed countries, since it made possible a pre-paid scheme for the majority of customers.
The economic analyses and arguments are about large developed economies, such as Australia, the UK and the USA, often focusing on calls from fixed to mobile networks. They largely ignore poorer users in poorer countries who do not have ready access to fixed lines and who might be very reluctant to pay for incoming calls. In many developing countries, the number of customers willing to subscribe to a monthly plan, rather than using pre-paid, is often small. It seems, prima facie, doubtful that they could easily be induced to switch to a monthly bucket plan. This appears to leave regulators with the tricky and potentially unpopular task of striking an interconnection rate that meets their various objectives.
As mobile Internet access and value-added services become more important, they are expected to dominate revenues, requiring the development of new charging models. However, that is not expected to happen immediately, with a migration towards Bill and Keep (B&K) possible in the interim (Wright, 2002) . For many years Hong Kong, SAR, has operated a light-handed, market-driven approach to the regulation of interconnection (Yan, 2001) . Following a public consultation, the Office of the Telecommunications Authority (OFTA) announced that it would modify the arrangements for fixed-to-mobile interconnection charges, but only after a two-year transition period (OFTA, 2007) . From April 2009 it withdrew the regulatory guidance that had favoured Mobile Party's Network Pays (MPNP), sometimes termed Receiving Party Pays (RPP). Thereafter, interconnection charges were settled amongst the fixed and mobile operators by commercial negotiations, without ex ante intervention.
Under a system of CPP there is an incentive for operators to increase or not to reduce their termination rates in the knowledge these will be passed on to customers who have insufficiently understood or weighed the likely prices others will pay to call them. Driving the level of mobile termination rates down towards cost has proved much more difficult and taken much longer than had been anticipated. Switching to RPP is generally considered impractical, especially in developing countries, leaving two options, either bill and keep or commercial negotiations. Hong Kong suggests that the latter is possible, though the circumstances may not be replicable elsewhere, at least in the short term. The major problem for the operators is the transition to a regime such as bill and keep, given their historic reliance on revenues from termination.
Remittances and banking
In other parts of the world mobile operators have established in the electronic payments market (Jenkins, 2008) . For example, Japanese mobile operators working with Sony have the FeLiCa system with Near Field Communications (NFC) embedded in handsets, which can be used to pay for public transport and small purchases in stores (Mainwaring et al., 2008) . In Kenya, the successful M-Pesa system allows credit transfers between customers and small payments to traders, since the banking system is much less extensive than in Japan M-Pesa is addressing the "unbanked" − both customers and small traders without a bank account (Comninos et al., 2008) .
Some of the larger mobile operator groups offer trans-national transactions, seeking a share of the lucrative remittance business. Officially recorded remittances to developing countries were US$ 338 billion in 2008, more than foreign aid, making it a very attractive activity in which the mobile operator groups can challenge traditional banks and players such as Western Union (see Table 5 ). The European Commission has conducted extensive consultations on m-payment systems, to reconcile the very different approaches of the banking and telecommunications regulations and regulators, seeking to achieve an appropriate balance. The problems include the necessary reserves to be held and concerns over money laundering and payments for drugs and terrorists. Caribbean regulators will have to address these issues.
Inflows
Potentially, a mobile operator could use a dominant position in the access market to leverage power into the mobile payments market, as might a bank use its dominance in the banking market.
Conclusion
To understand more fully the developments of telecommunications markets in the small island economies of the Caribbean more data must be collected, from both operators and consumers. Censuses, household surveys and some specific surveys into the use of ICTs by the very poor, the disabled and those with limited literacy would all be beneficial. The present shortage of data heightens the risk of inappropriate policy and regulatory decisions.
Despite the image of financial services and expensive hotels, there are significant levels of poverty. While many of the poor may have a mobile phone or at least a SIM-card, they may be severely constrained in their use, relying on receiving calls, or on asking others to call them. For those who are illiterate or only partially literate there are significant barriers to the use of telecommunications, for example, in the otherwise ubiquitous SMS service. Nor will they be able to use the growing range of value-added and e-government services or access the Internet.
It is essential to separate out international mobile roaming from domestic traffic and revenues in order properly to understand the two markets. The link between the fluctuating number of tourists and telecommunications revenues needs to be better understood, not least the risks from any future downturn. It is necessary to know the extent to which operators use roaming revenues to subsidize handsets or to pay for capital investments.
It is also important to identify the sources of the "surplus" of customers over residents, often equivalent to the population. It is not desirable that everyone carries two phones, let alone three. Knowledge of the behavior of visitors and residents contributing to this "surplus" is essential to an understanding of the markets, especially the underlying failures.
In an ideal world there would be a Caribbean counterpart of the Pew Internet and American Life project to monitor how the various communities (real and virtual) adopt, use and modify new technologies and services. Such an institution would greatly aid governments and regulators in understanding trends in their markets.
The extension of mobile telecommunications requires increased coordination with financial regulators on the issues of remittances and m-banking.
